E-Commerce, Parcel Delivery and Environmental Policy

Claire Borsenberger, Helmuth Cremer, Denis Joram, Jean-Marie Lozachmeur () and Estelle Malavolti ()
Additional contact information
Claire Borsenberger: Groupe La Poste
Denis Joram: Groupe La Poste
Jean-Marie Lozachmeur: TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Estelle Malavolti: ENAC-LAB - Laboratoire de recherche ENAC - ENAC - Ecole Nationale de l'Aviation Civile

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Abstract: We study the design of environmental policy in the e-commerce sector and examine two main questions. First, what is the appropriate "level" of intervention along the value chain. Second, which instruments should be used at a specific level in the vertical chain? We consider a model with two retailers/producers who sell a differentiated product and two parcel delivery operators. The production, retailing and delivery of these goods generates CO2 emissions. We assume that it is more expensive for the retailers and the delivery operators to use "green" technologies. We consider different scenarios reflecting the type of competition and the vertical structure of the industry. In all cases the equilibria are inefficient for two reasons. First, at both level of the value chain (at the production/retailing stage and the delivery stage), the levels of emissions are too large (given the output levels - the number of items produced and delivered). Second the levels of outputs are not efficient because the cost of emissions is not reflected by the consumer prices. We show that in the perfect competition scenario a uniform Pigouvian tax on emission, reflecting the marginal social damage, is sufficient to correct both types of inefficiencies. Under imperfect competition a Pigouvian emissions tax is also necessary, but it has to be supplemented by positive or negative taxes on the quantity of good produced and delivered. The specific design of these instruments is affected by vertical integration between a retailer and a delivery operator.

Keywords: E-Commerce; Environmental policy; Pigouvian (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-03-11
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Published in Pier Luigi Parcu; Timothy J. Brennan; Victor Glass. The Postal and Delivery Contribution in Hard Times, Springer International Publishing, pp.141-160, 2023, Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy, 978-3-031-11412-0. ⟨10.1007/978-3-031-11413-7_10⟩

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Related works:
Chapter: E-Commerce, Parcel Delivery and Environmental Policy (2023)
Working Paper: E-commerce, parcel delivery and environmental policy (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05568304

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-11413-7_10

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