WHY BUDGET REFORMS FAIL IN FRAGILE STATES: A political economy of discretion and non-reform in the Sahel

Étienne Fakaba and Pierre Bayo
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Pierre Bayo: Université des sciences sociales et de gestion de Bamako - USSGB - Université des sciences sociales et de gestion de Bamako, CRAPES MALI - Centre de Recherche et d'Analyses Politiques, Economiques et Sociales du Mali

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Abstract: Budget reforms in fragile states repeatedly fail despite extensive diagnostics and widely available policy frameworks. This article explains this persistence by conceptualising budgetary non-reform as an endogenous institutional equilibrium that preserves discretionary power. It argues that effective budgetary authority is not located in formal budget laws but in public treasury management, which structures both ex ante design and ex post execution through liquidity control. Drawing on a controlled comparison of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, the analysis identifies stable blocking coalitions across central administrations, security actors, and political elites, whose converging interests make reform politically costly and collectively unattractive. It further shows that crises reinforce rather than disrupt this equilibrium by increasing the political value of discretion and executive control. The article contributes to public administration and political economy debates by demonstrating that non-reform is not a failure of capacity or will, but a rational outcome of power-preserving institutional configurations.

Keywords: H68; D72; O23; P16; political economy budgetary non-reform discretionary power public treasury state fragility authoritarian governance Sahel JEL Codes: H61 H68 P16 O23 D72; political economy; budgetary non-reform; discretionary power; public treasury; state fragility; authoritarian governance; Sahel; political economy; budgetary non-reform; discretionary power; public treasury; Sahel JEL Codes: H61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
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Published in Journal of Economics, Finance and Management (JEFM), 2026, 5 (2), pp.358-373. ⟨10.5281/zenodo.20031471⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05612070

DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.20031471

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