Strategic free-riding in pest control: Theory and evidence in organic-conventional mixed landscapes

Le parasitisme stratégique dans la lutte contre les ravageurs: théorie et données empiriques dans les paysages mixtes (agriculture biologique et conventionnelle)

François Bareille (), Vincent Martinet () and Jean-Sauveur Ay ()
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François Bareille: UMR PSAE - Paris-Saclay Applied Economics - AgroParisTech - Université Paris-Saclay - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, GSSI - Gran Sasso Science Institute, CMCC - Euro-Mediterranean Center on Climate Change, RFF-CMCC European Institute on Economics and the Environment (Milan)
Vincent Martinet: UMR PSAE - Paris-Saclay Applied Economics - AgroParisTech - Université Paris-Saclay - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, CEPS - Centre d'Economie de l'ENS Paris-Saclay - Université Paris-Saclay - ENS Paris Saclay - Ecole Normale Supérieure Paris-Saclay
Jean-Sauveur Ay: CESAER - Centre d'Economie et de Sociologie Rurales Appliquées à l'Agriculture et aux Espaces Ruraux - AgroSup Dijon - Institut National Supérieur des Sciences Agronomiques, de l'Alimentation et de l'Environnement - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement

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Abstract: Organic and conventional farmers face the same pests but differ in technologies and economic incentives to control them. This paper theoretically and empirically characterizes the strategic interactions for pest control between these two types of farmers within mixed organic-conventional landscapes. Our non-cooperative game model shows that each farmer type is expected to strategically free-ride on the other's control efforts when managing a sufficiently small share of the landscape, and that the extent of free-riding increases with lower pest pressure, higher relative treatment costs, and lower treatment efficacy. Using exhaustive French postcode-level data on insecticide purchases against the vector of a vine disease (Flavescence dorée), we provide empirical support for all our theoretical propositions. Our preferred estimates indicate that organic farmers free-ride on conventional farmers' efforts until they reach about 8% of the landscape. Beyond this threshold, organic treatments only partially substitute for reduced conventional treatments, up to a point where conventional farmers may eventually free-ride if the organic landscape share becomes large enough. Consistent with the model's predictions, high pest pressure substantially reduces the scope for free-riding, while differences in relative treatment costs and treatment efficacy also affect its extent, though to a lesser degree.

Keywords: Strategic interaction; Mobile public bad; Spatial externalities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-06
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.inrae.fr/hal-05615322v1
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Published in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2026, 138, pp.103346. ⟨10.1016/j.jeem.2026.103346⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05615322

DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2026.103346

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