Strategic repugnance: How narratives reshape moral constraints in markets

Gilles Grolleau, Alain Marciano and Naoufel Mzoughi ()
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Gilles Grolleau: CEREN - Centre de Recherche sur l'ENtreprise [Dijon] - BSB - Burgundy School of Business (BSB) - Ecole Supérieure de Commerce de Dijon Bourgogne (ESC)
Alain Marciano: UNITO - Università degli studi di Torino = University of Turin
Naoufel Mzoughi: ECODEVELOPPEMENT - Ecodéveloppement - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement

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Abstract: We argue that repugnance is not always a constraint but can, in some cases, be strategically used as a resource by some "entrepreneurs" who can leverage the 'veil of repugnance' itself to advance their own goals. To understand the conditions in which such a strategic use of repugnance is possible, and how these individuals can use it, we first propose a conceptual framework to characterize repugnance-related transactions and emphasize how concerned individuals devise narratives to manage these situations, increase (or even decrease) artificially their acceptability and ultimately justify their behavior. This framework, which combines relational proximity and the strength of social consensus surrounding a transaction, allows for predicting the costs of developing appropriate narratives. Then, we analyze four rationales by which entrepreneurial individuals exploit and use strategically repugnant dimensions. Repugnance can be strategically leveraged as a barrier to entry, a tool for niche differentiation, a mechanism of political and market polarization, and a means of attracting attention, thereby shaping competition, regulation, and visibility across markets and platforms.

Keywords: strategic repugnance; taboo trade-offs; distastefulness; repugnance; narratives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.inrae.fr/hal-05631948v1
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Published in Journal of Institutional Economics, inPress

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05631948

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