The patrimonial model and organized crime: The case of Corsica

Modèle patrimonial et crime organisé: le cas de la Corse

Jean Pralong () and Sébastien Dubois ()
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Jean Pralong: Métis Lab EM Normandie - EM Normandie - École de Management de Normandie = EM Normandie Business School
Sébastien Dubois: NEOMA - Neoma Business School

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Abstract: Despite its socio-economic impact, organized crime has received little attention from management research. Based on the critique of the two dominant models of organized crime (bureaucratic and entrepreneurial) and Weberian sociology, we propose the alternative model of patrimonial organization. Based on the Corsican case, we show how this model sheds light on the way in which criminal organizations resolve the two organizational paradoxes they face: the apparent contradiction between security and flexibility, and the connection between short and long timeframes. The patrimonial model is based on the personalization of power, contracts, and income, the status of bosses understood as their ability to instill fear, and the (paradoxical) legitimacy enjoyed by criminal organizations strongly anchored in a territory they control. We conclude this article by explaining why Corsican organized crime, as powerful as it is, is not a mafia.

Date: 2024-06-25
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Published in Gérer et Comprendre. Annales des Mines, 2024, 156, pp.31-40. ⟨10.3917/e.geco1.161.0020⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05638068

DOI: 10.3917/e.geco1.161.0020

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