Senegal’s Debt: Breaking the Deadlock Through Credibility, Liquidity, and Transparency

Vincent de Paul Kambou
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Vincent de Paul Kambou: CERDI - Centre d'Études et de Recherches sur le Développement International - IRD - Institut de Recherche pour le Développement - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UCA - Université Clermont Auvergne

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Abstract: This note analyses the crisis in Senegal as a crisis of fiscal credibility that has shifted the constraint towards liquidity and refinancing. It argues that reducing the risk premium requires a coherent strategy based on transparency, credible IMF anchoring, concessional bridge financing, active liability management and targeted consolidation. Finally, it shows that the use of complex instruments and the regional market may offer temporary respite, but in the medium-term increases opacity, the fragility of refinancing and regional vulnerabilities, whilst reinforcing the need for transparency, governance and policy coherence.

Keywords: Debt; Senegal (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-06-10
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-05652679v1
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Published in 2026

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