Pax Phytosa: Managing the Risk of Failure to Transition to Agroecology

La Pax Phytosa: la gestion du risque de non-transition agroécologique

Martial Phélippé-Guinvarc'h () and Jean Cordier
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Martial Phélippé-Guinvarc'h: GAINS - Groupe d'Analyse des Itinéraires et des Niveaux Salariaux - UM - Le Mans Université, UM - Le Mans Université
Jean Cordier: AGROCAMPUS OUEST, Institut Agro Rennes Angers - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement

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Abstract: The proposed policy, referred to as "Pax Phytosa" in the document, is based on a reverse auction mechanism that allocates subsidies to farms willing to bear the economic risk associated with phasing out plant protection products. This mechanism aims to address two distinct risks borne by different actors: a transition risk borne by individual farms and a risk of failure to transition at the aggregate level. The contribution of this article lies in the way bids are designed. Bids can be expressed as a proportion of standard gross product (SGP) to account for the economic heterogeneity of agricultural systems and their respective outcomes. Using data from the Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN), the mechanism is simulated at the national level to estimate the minimum budgetary cost required to achieve different target levels. The results show that an annual budget of approximately 400 million euros would make it possible to commit nearly 30% of France's utilitarian agricultural area or nearly 40% of the plant-based standard gross product (SGP), while revealing significant regional variation in marginal transition costs. Beyond its budgetary efficiency, this mechanism serves to reveal to public authorities the private costs incurred by farmers associated with phasing out plant protection products. These new empirical data help inform regulators about farms' adaptation trajectories. The Pax Phytosa thus emerges as an alternative to lump-sum payments and regulatory instruments, with the potential to improve the economic efficiency of pesticide reduction policies while contributing to public management based on the actual agricultural risk associated with the transition.

Keywords: subsidy; information asymmetry; risks; zero-pesticide; Reverse auctions; zéro phytosanitaire; pesticides; enchères inversées; Risques; Risques enchères inversées pesticides zéro phytosanitaire asymétrie d'information subvention Reverse auctions pesticides zero-pesticide risks information asymmetry subsidy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-06-15
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://univ-lemans.hal.science/hal-05659711v1
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Published in Journées Internationales du Risque, Laboratoire d'économie de Poitiers, Jun 2026, Poitiers, France

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