Understanding the blind spots in the warning process during NaTech events: lessons from the Blayais Nuclear Power Plant Flood in France (1999)

Claire Jaffrézic (), Elsa Gisquet and Johnny Douvinet ()
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Claire Jaffrézic: ESPACE - Études des Structures, des Processus d’Adaptation et des Changements de l’Espace - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (1965 - 2019) - AU - Avignon Université - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UniCA - Université Côte d'Azur
Elsa Gisquet: ASNR/PSN-EXP/SHOT/LSHS - Laboratoire de recherche en Sciences Humaines et Sociales - ASNR/PSN-EXP/SHOT - Service Homme Organisation Technologie - ASNR - Autorité de Sûreté Nucléaire et de Radioprotection
Johnny Douvinet: ESPACE - Études des Structures, des Processus d’Adaptation et des Changements de l’Espace - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (1965 - 2019) - AU - Avignon Université - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UniCA - Université Côte d'Azur, IUF - Institut universitaire de France - M.E.N.E.S.R. - Ministère de l'Education nationale, de l’Enseignement supérieur et de la Recherche

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Abstract: In a context of increasing industrialization, population growth in hazard-prone areas and intensification of hazard triggers, integrating NaTech risks into crisis management planning and warning processes has become more and more essential. This paper examines lessons learned from Hurricane Martin, which struck France on December 27, 1999 -causing the flooding of the Blayais Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) on the Gironde estuary. By focusing on the alert process and the coordination among actors, the study examines lessons learned beyond the dominant emphasis on technical and procedural solutions. It reconstructs the alert timeline, information flows, and decision-making chain based on reports from prefectural services, nuclear technical reports, and post-event press articles, in order to produce a "consolidated feedback".The study shows that vulnerability arises not only from physical impacts on infrastructure but also from fragmented communication and coordination, as each actor followed its own institutional logic and corrective procedures. This fragmentation highlights dilemmas related to alerts that could have arisen, such as conflicting instructions between sheltering (to limit radiological exposure) and evacuation (due to flooding). Finally, this near-miss accident demonstrates the need for preparatory lessons-learned frameworks that capture how risk is progressively built through signal interpretation, uncertainty management, governance arrangements, and alert practices in complex NaTech crises.

Keywords: storm; flood; nuclear; experience feedback; warning; NaTech (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-06-14
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-05668619v1
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Published in 2026 European Safety and Reliability Conference (ESREL 2026), ESRA, Jun 2026, Braga, Portugal. pp.3551-3558, ⟨10.3850/ESREL2026061419_esrel26-p26452-cd⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05668619

DOI: 10.3850/ESREL2026061419_esrel26-p26452-cd

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