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Will Mechanism Design Set Us Free? Algorithmic Institutions and Hayekian Liberty

Kevin Leportier ()
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Kevin Leportier: CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, INSPÉ Normandie Caen - Institut national supérieur du professorat et de l'éducation - Normandie Caen - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université

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Abstract: This paper examines whether the algorithmic institutions developed within market design are compatible with the Hayekian conception of liberty as the absence of coercion. While market design is often presented as a continuation of Hayekian insights regarding dispersed knowledge and decentralized coordination, this paper argues that Hayekian liberty depends on more than decentralized choice. It also requires a stable institutional environment within which individuals can form coherent plans and learn from experience. Algorithmic institutions tend to weaken this stability, thereby undermining Hayekian liberty.

Keywords: Hayek; Algorithmic institutions; Coercion; Liberty; Freedom; Market design; Mechanism design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-05-26
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-05676848v1
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Published in 1st joint conference of the European Society for the History of Economic Thought (ESHET) and the History of Economics Society (HES), May 2026, Nice, France

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