WHAT ARE THE EFFECTS OF THE CEO-CHAIR DUAL STRUCTURE AND CEO TENURE ON TECHNOLOGICAL AND NON-TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION? EVIDENCE FROM FRANCE

Ouidad Yousfi ()
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Ouidad Yousfi: UM - Université de Montpellier

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Abstract: This study examines the impacts of entrenched and powerful CEOs on both technological and non-technological innovations. It utilises a rare longitudinal dataset from France between 2004 and 2016. The analysis reveals that the concentration of control and management power drives CEOs to prioritise marketing innovations that are likely to enhance their market image and reputation. Turning to CEO tenure, our results provide evidence that entrenched CEOs prefer the "status quo", often resisting significant changes or disruptions to maintain their control and influence within the company. Finally, we find a negative association between management innovations and busy directors who serve on multiple boards. These results are robust in high and medium-high-tech industries. We suggest providing greater incentives to CEOs to spearhead challenging and disruptive innovation projects.

Keywords: Powerful CEO; tenure; entrenchment; busyness; status quo; management innovation; marketing innovation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-07-02
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Published in International Journal of Innovation Management, 2026

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05682898

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