The Organizational Black Box: Understanding Systemic Vulnerabilities at the Sharp End / Blunt End Interface

Elliot Quiriconi (), Didier Delaitre () and Eric Rigaud ()
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Elliot Quiriconi: INERIS - Institut National de l'Environnement Industriel et des Risques, DRM - Dauphine Recherches en Management - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, M-Lab - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres, Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres
Didier Delaitre: CRC - Centre de recherche sur les Risques et les Crises - Mines Paris - PSL (École nationale supérieure des mines de Paris) - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres, Mines Paris - PSL (École nationale supérieure des mines de Paris) - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres
Eric Rigaud: CRC - Centre de recherche sur les Risques et les Crises - Mines Paris - PSL (École nationale supérieure des mines de Paris) - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres, Mines Paris - PSL (École nationale supérieure des mines de Paris) - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres

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Abstract: Safety models for complex sociotechnical systems have progressively shifted from individual error to organizational and systemic perspectives. Reason's defense-in-depth model identifies latent conditions but does not explain how they remain invisible to the actors who produce them. Cook and Woods' sharp end/blunt end distinction reveals informational asymmetries without formalizing the mechanisms that sustain them. This paper proposes the Organizational Black Box model, grounded in Ashby's cybernetic concept of the black box and extended from the technical to the organizational scale, to address this gap. The model articulates three interdependent dimensions: bidirectional opacity between sharp end and blunt end, requisite variety reduction through organizational feedback channels, and delegated trust degradation producing collective automation biases. The framework is applied retrospectively to the BEA final investigation report on flight AF447 Rio-Paris (June 1, 2009). The case study illustrates how these three dimensions interact to produce an emergent systemic vulnerability: opacity sustains silent propagation of erroneous assumptions across organizational boundaries, variety reduction filters corrective signals before they reach regulatory actors, and delegated trust stabilizes the system in its vulnerable configuration. While limited to a single retrospective case and remaining qualitative, the model contributes a complementary analytical lens focused on the generative role of organizational opacity-a dimension acknowledged but insufficiently formalized in existing safety frameworks. Directions for prospective application, formal modeling, and cross-domain validation are discussed.

Keywords: Organizational opacity; Black box; Requisite variety; Trust degradation; Systemic vulnerability; AF447 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-05711017v1
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Published in ESREL 2026, 2026, Braga, Portugal. ⟨10.3850/ESREL2026061419_esrel26-p26235-cd⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05711017

DOI: 10.3850/ESREL2026061419_esrel26-p26235-cd

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