Stackelberg-Cournot and Cournot Equilibria in a Mixed Markets Exchange Economy

Ludovic Julien ()
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Ludovic Julien: EconomiX - EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: In this note, we compare two strategic general equilibrium concepts: the Stackelberg-Cournot equilibrium and the Cournot equilibrium. We thus consider a market exchange economy including atoms and a continuum of traders, who behave strategically. We show that, when the preferences of the small traders are represented by Cobb-Douglas utility functions and the atoms have the same utility functions and endowments, the Stackelberg-Cournot and the Cournot equilibrium equilibria coincide if and only if the followers' best responses functions have a zero slope at the SCE.

Keywords: Conjectural Variations; Preferences; Stackelberg-Cournot Equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Published in Theoretical Economics Letters, 2012, 02 (03), pp.300-306. ⟨10.4236/tel.2012.23056⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05758733

DOI: 10.4236/tel.2012.23056

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