MARKET PRICE MECHANISMS AND STACKELBERG GENERAL EQUILIBRIA: AN EXAMPLE

Ludovic Julien () and Fabrice Tricou ()
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Ludovic Julien: EconomiX - EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Fabrice Tricou: EconomiX - EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: ABSTRACT This paper considers Stackelberg competition in a general equilibrium framework with a productivesector. The working of market power and the configurations of strategic interactions are complexifiedby the presence of a leader. Two market price mechanisms are studied: one is associated with theStackelberg–Walras equilibrium and the other is linked to the Stackelberg–Cournot equilibrium.Throughout the example of a two commodity economy, several results are obtained about equilibriamergings and about welfare comparisons.

Keywords: Oligopolistic competition; Welfare; General equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-01-20
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Published in Bulletin of Economic Research, 2011, 64 (2), pp.239-252. ⟨10.1111/j.1467-8586.2010.00362.x⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05758767

DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8586.2010.00362.x

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