Chômage d’équilibre, équilibres multiples et défauts de coordination

Ludovic Julien ()
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Ludovic Julien: UPN - Université Paris Nanterre

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Abstract: This article analyzes the contribution of the macroeconomics of coordination failures to unemployment equilibrium theory. Coordination failures deal with the interactions of rational agents in decentralized market economies. Such an approach gives microeconomic foundations for persistent unemployment equilibria in a general equilibrium framework without assuming sticky prices and wages. In this recent literature, we distinguish between three kinds of coordination failures, each of which causes unemployment. The issues are then: (i) the microeconomics of coordination failures, (ii) the aggregate demand externalities, (iii) the transaction externalities and (iv) the role of increasing returns to scale. Policies and equilibrium selection are developed within the article.

Date: 2005-03-08
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Published in Actualite Economique, 2005, 79 (4), pp.523-562. ⟨10.7202/010565ar⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05758895

DOI: 10.7202/010565ar

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