A folk theorem for finitely repeated games with public monitoring

Johannes Hörner and Jérôme Renault
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Johannes Hörner: CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse
Jérôme Renault: TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse

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Abstract: We provide a Folk theorem for finitely repeated games under imperfect public monitoring, under a strengthening of the standard assumptions required for finitely repeated games with perfect monitoring, and of those for discounted repeated games under imperfect public monitoring. Our proof uses standard recursive methods and assumes the existence of a public randomization device. Three counterexamples show in which sense our assumptions are tight.

Keywords: Finitely repeated games; Public signals; Public randomization device (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-09
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Published in Journal of Economic Theory, 2026, vol. 236, ⟨10.1016/j.jet.2026.106227⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05761011

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106227

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