Farmers' Acceptance of Agri-Environmental Auctions: a Survey Experiment

Adrien Coiffard (), Raphaële Préget () and Mabel Tidball ()
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Adrien Coiffard: CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - UM - Université de Montpellier
Raphaële Préget: CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - UM - Université de Montpellier
Mabel Tidball: CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - UM - Université de Montpellier

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Abstract: We conducted a survey experiment with more than 4000 French farmers to investigate their preferences regarding agri-environmental auctions as a mechanism for allocating payments for environmental services. Participants evaluated three hypothetical auction formats: auctions based on payment bids only, auctions based on agri-environmental contract specifications only, and auctions combining both dimensions. These formats were compared with a reference scenario in which both payment and contract specifications were fixed on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Althought preferences vary substantially across farmers, our results show that agrienvironmental auctions are, on average, preferred to the reference scenario. However, preferences differ significantly across auction formats. In particular, farmers express a stronger preference for auctions that promote competition over contract specifications rather than over payment levels. These findings suggest that farmers' preferences for agri-environmental auctions critically depend on auction design, with important implications for participation in such schemes.

Keywords: Agri-environmental policy; Payment for environmental services; Reverse auction; Conservation auctions; Survey experiment; Conservation tenders (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-09-24
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Published in REECAP 6th annual congress, Sep 2024, Cordoba, Spain

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