Promoting Cooperation in an Unequal World: Experimental evidence on the Role of Transparency and Punishment
Antoine Malezieux,
Jingnan Cecilia Chen,
John d'Attoma and
Miguel a Fonseca
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Antoine Malezieux: BSB - Burgundy School of Business (BSB) - ESC Dijon-Bourgogne, CEREN - Centre de Recherche sur les Entreprises - BSB - Burgundy School of Business (BSB) - ESC Dijon-Bourgogne
Jingnan Cecilia Chen: University of Exeter
Miguel a Fonseca: University of Exeter
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Abstract:
Across two studies, we examine the role of transparency and peer punishment in promoting cooperation and addressing economic inequality in public good contributions. With global inequality rising and the wealthiest few amassing a greater share of resources, its impact on social cohesion and business environments is increasingly significant. Financial secrecy further compounds these issues by allowing for income and wealth concealment at both societal and organizational levels. Our experimental findings reveal that transparency paired with peer punishment significantly boosts cooperation, particularly among advantaged individuals. In contrast, peer punishment alone proves insufficient to mitigate the adverse effects of inequality without the support of transparency. These results underscore the need for ethical governance structures that incorporate transparency, fairness, and accountability—principles essential for organizations committed to fostering trust and social responsibility in unequal settings.
Keywords: Inequality; Transparency; Secrecy; Public good; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-12-01
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Published in Journal of Business Ethics, 2025, 202, pp.823-842. ⟨10.1007/s10551-025-05998-8⟩
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05798779
DOI: 10.1007/s10551-025-05998-8
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