Interaction of spectrum auctions and mobile market competition: Review of theory and evidence from European 4G auctions

Daniel Ershov and David J. Salant
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Daniel Ershov: UCL - University College London [UCL]
David J. Salant: TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement

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Abstract: This paper examines the effects of ex ante market structure on spectrum auctions and their impact on mobile market outcomes. We review the relevant theory and provide a simple analytic framework suggesting that larger incumbents acquire more spectrum in auctions to disadvantage smaller competitors. Using novel data on European 4G spectrum auctions, we present suggestive evidence of this effect for low-band (

Keywords: Mobile telecommunications; Auctions; Competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-06
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Published in International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2026, Vol. 106, ⟨10.1016/j.ijindorg.2026.103287⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05801472

DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2026.103287

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