Making Auctions for Transport Capacity to Roll

David J. Salant, Frédéric Cherbonnier and Karine Van der Straeten
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David J. Salant: TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement
Frédéric Cherbonnier: TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, IEP Toulouse - Sciences Po Toulouse - Institut d'études politiques de Toulouse
Karine Van der Straeten: TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: Policymakers increasingly auction upstream inputs to promote downstream competition in network industries, including rail slots, airport slots, spectrum, and transmission rights. We study how selling capacity as a single package versus in sequential tranches affects entry when an incumbent holds an initial endowment. In a two-stage model with Cournot competition downstream, one-shot auctions allow unrestricted incumbents block entry, whereas sequential auctions may incentivize accommodation. Simulations calibrated to the Paris–Lyon route illustrate the sensitivity of entry to tranche design and demand.

Keywords: auctions; open access; rail transportation; regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-05-27
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Published in Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 2026, ⟨10.1111/jems.70036⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05801496

DOI: 10.1111/jems.70036

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