Geopolitical energy shocks and consumer protection under fiscal constraints

Jules Sadefo Kamdem

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: How can energy-importing governments protect fuel-dependent households during geopolitical crises without suppressing conservation incentives or making unaffordable fiscal promises? We develop conditional insurance based on pre-crisis reference fuel consumption, with transfers independent of current purchases. Under stated assumptions, fixed payments preserve the marginal pump-price signal; a strictly concave allocation problem determines how to distribute scarce assistance. A dated liquidity rule prioritizes binding infrastructure guarantees and committed low-carbon investment before discretionary relief, and identifies the conditions under which protection must be rationed or financing fails. Guarantees require verified project-specific external losses and contractual caps. French monthly fuel-price analyses for 2020–2026, a longer exploratory global VAR, and a European synthetic-control comparison of France's September 2022 intervention illustrate implementation. The latter captures a combined public–private discount and has low-powered donor placebos; it does not isolate the causal effect of the state rebate. Externally released geopolitical energy and macro surprises provide additional exploratory transmission diagnostics; their underlying structural model is not re-estimated and French event samples remain sparse. The framework offers conditional, auditable policy rules rather than a demonstrated universal welfare ranking or unconditional sovereign solvency.

Keywords: Sovereign hedging; Fiscal liquidity; Reference-quantity transfers; Consumer protection; Fuel-price pass-through; Geopolitical risk (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2027-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in Energy Policy, 2027, 220, pp.115654. ⟨10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115654⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05805797

DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115654

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().