How Compensation Committees Shape Performance Share Awards to Executives: Insights from Agency and Managerial Power Theories
Évelyne Poincelot
Additional contact information
Évelyne Poincelot: CREGO - Centre de Recherche en Gestion des Organisations - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) Mulhouse - Colmar - UMLP - Université Marie et Louis Pasteur - UBE - Université Bourgogne Europe
Post-Print from HAL
Abstract:
The aim of the article is to study the allocation of performance shares to corporate officers and the role of the compensation committee (CC). Either the CC awards performance shares with the aim of aligning the interests of executives with those of shareholders or other stakeholders (agency theory). Or the CC allocates the performance shares desired by the manager himself by becoming an instrument at his service (theory of managerial power). Does the composition of the CC reveal its role? The answer could be positive if we also analyse the ownership structure.
Keywords: Stock option; Managerial power theory; Agency theory; Performance share (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-04-30
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:
Published in Bankers Markets & Investors : an academic & professional review, 2026, N° 183 (4), pp.44-52. ⟨10.54695/bmi.183.0044⟩
There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05849658
DOI: 10.54695/bmi.183.0044
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().