40 Years of Tax Evasion Games: A Meta-Analysis
Antoine Malezieux and
James Alm
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Antoine Malezieux: BSB - Burgundy School of Business (BSB) - ESC Dijon-Bourgogne
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Abstract:
We collect individual participant data from 70 papers that use laboratory experiments to examine individual tax evasion behavior (or "Tax Evasion Games"), in order to use meta-analysis to estimate the impacts of different public policy, experimental design and individual level variables on tax evasion choices. Our results show that standard enforcement variables like audits (including audit rules) and fines perform differently on the extensive and intensive margins. We find that other fiscal variables like a flat tax system, tax rates, and tax amnesties have unambiguous negative impacts on tax compliance, and that specific features of the experimental setting, such as how subjects are directed to report income, or whether taxes are redistributed to the participants or to a real life public good, have significant impacts on tax compliance. Our results also indicate that the demographic characteristics of the subjects (e.g., gender, experimental income, occupation, risk attitude) affect compliance.
Keywords: Tax evasion; Tax compliance; Meta-analysis; C9: Design of Experiments; JEL CODE H3: Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-09-01
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Published in Experimental Economics, 2021, 24 (3), pp.699-750. ⟨10.1007/s10683-020-09679-3⟩
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05863040
DOI: 10.1007/s10683-020-09679-3
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