Concurrence fiscale et redistribution dans l'UEM: l'intérêt d'une intervention supra-nationale

Amélie Barbier-Gauchard ()

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Abstract: In the EMU, the redistributive policies of national governments are threatened by the fiscal competition. From a theoretical model of a union composed with two countries, we study the interest of an intervention of a supranational government to fight against the harmful effects of fiscal competition. In this model, skilled workers and physical capital can move between countries. We show that the non cooperative game between the national government creates a bias in favour of the skilled workers. In these conditions, by taxing the public goods offered by each government, the central government can modify the affectation of the national budgets.

Keywords: Fiscal Competition; Fiscal Federalism; Mobility; Strategic Interactions.; Concurrence fiscale; redistribution; fédéralisme budgétaire; mobilité; interactions stratégiques.; interactions stratégiques (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-12-09
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Published in 2005

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Working Paper: Concurrence fiscale et redistribution dans l'UEM: l'intérêt d'une intervention supra-nationale (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00007677

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