Résolution des problèmes d'information en microfinance

Magloire Lanha

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Abstract: Solving information problems in microfinance An analysis based on the strategy of Vital-Finance Benin This paper specifies the ways information problems a solved in direct microcrédit institutions. The concept of pre-default is built to preserve banking secrecy whereas it permits appropriates econometric tests on a typical microcrédit institution. A logit model has identified the determinants of pre-default. The findings are generally those of the literature. Nevertheless, the long-term relationship does not reduce pre-default. This fact is seemingly advantageous for both parties: the debtor is no longer obliged to pay exactly at falling due and the micro-banker receives a rescheduling commission without any marginal cost

Keywords: group lending with joint liability; long-term relationship; information asymmetry; pre-default; asymétrie d'information; microcrédit; pré-défaillance; groupe de caution solidaire; relation de long terme (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Published in Mondes en Développement, 2002, 30 (119), pp.47-61

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00009022

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