On the Chacteristic Numbers of Voting Games

Vincent Merlin () and Matthieu Martin
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Matthieu Martin: THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - UCP - Université de Cergy Pontoise - Université Paris-Seine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: This paper deals with the non-emptiness of the stability set for any proper voting game. We present an upper bound on the number of alternatives which guarantees the non emptiness of this solution concept. We show that this bound is greater than or equal to the one given by Le Breton and Salles (1990) for quota games.

Keywords: voting game; core; stability set (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00010172v1
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Published in International Game Theory Review, 2006, 8 (4), pp.643--654. ⟨10.1142/S0219198906001156⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00010172

DOI: 10.1142/S0219198906001156

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