Does contributing sequentially increase the level of cooperation in public goods game ? an experimental investigation
David Masclet () and
Marc Willinger ()
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Keywords: public; goods; game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Published in A nnual meeting of ESA, Jun 2005, montreal, Canada. pp.29
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Working Paper: Does Contributing Sequentially Increase the Level of Cooperation in Public Goods Games ? An Experimental Investigation (2006)
Working Paper: Does Contributing Sequentially Increase the Level of Cooperation in Public Goods Games ? An Experimental Investigation (2005)
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