Social Insurance with Indirect Democracy

Stéphane Rossignol and Emmanuelle Taugourdeau

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Abstract: In a representative democracy model we determine the preferred social insurance system. We show that it corresponds to that which implies the lowest contribution rate when the risk aversion is high.

Keywords: social insurance; indirect democracy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-01
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Published in Economics Letters, 2004, 82 (1), pp.127-134. ⟨10.1016/j.econlet.2003.09.012⟩

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Working Paper: Social Insurance with Indirect Democracy (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00069086

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2003.09.012

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