Quality-improving alliances in differentiated oligopoly

Frédéric Deroïan () and Frédéric Gannon

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Abstract: We study rival firms' incentives in quality-improving Research and Development (R&D) networks. The analysis stresses the role of free riding associated to collaboration and three major consequences emerge: R&D efforts decrease with the number of partners, networks of alliances are over-connected as compared to the social optimum and the profitmaximizing number of alliances is possibly non monotonic (decreasing then increasing) with respect to inverse measure of product differentiation.

Keywords: Vertically and horizontally Differentiated Oligopoly; Product Innovation; R&D Alliance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-05
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00084891
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Published in International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2006, 24 (2), pp.629-637. ⟨10.1016/j.ijindorg.2005.09.006⟩

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Journal Article: Quality-improving alliances in differentiated oligopoly (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00084891

DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2005.09.006

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