Negative externalities and Sen's liberalism thorem

Anne Pétron () and Donald Saari
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Anne Pétron: CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Donald Saari: Institute for Mathematical Behavioral Science - UC Irvine - University of California [Irvine] - UC - University of California

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Abstract: Sen's seminal, negative theorem about minimal liberalism has had a profound effect on economics, philosophy, and the social sciences. To address concerns raised by his result, we show how Sen's assumptions must be modified to obtain positive conclusions; e.g., one resolution allows an agent to be decisive only if his choice does not impose "strong negative externalities" on others. We also uncover a significantly different interpretation of Sen's societal cycles: rather than describing the rights of individuals to choose, the cycles identify when these choices impose difficulties on others. Other ways to address Sen's difficulties come from game theory.

Keywords: Sen's theorem; Externalities; Paradoxes; Prisoner's Dilemma; Game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in Economic Theory, 2006, 28 (2), pp.265-281

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00094539

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