Organizational and Institutional Dynamics On The Evolution of Property Rights: Historical Evidence

M. C Thaize-Challier
Additional contact information
M. C Thaize-Challier: CERAG - Centre d'études et de recherches appliquées à la gestion - UPMF - Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble 2 - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: This article studies property rights through relationships between custom, institutions, and organizations. Using historical evidence, it examines the evolution of property rights in French medieval economy. The success of some tenants in obtaining the effective ownership is scrutinized on the basis of seigniorial policy and tenants' responses. This paper shows how strategies were articulated around concepts of property rights (residual rights, differents ways in getting rights, alliance and integration (tie-ins) versus rivalry and exclusion, coercive power or voluntary exchanges, transaction costs, and incentives. It sheds light on redesigns of institutions and organizations through causes and consequences of rebundlings of rights.

Keywords: Property Rights; Institutions; Custom; Organization; Medieval Economy; Organisation; Economie; Droits de Propriété; Coutume (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in 2005

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00101651

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().