Absorption des connaissances et localisation internationale de la R&D des entreprises

Bernard Franck and Robert Owen ()
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Bernard Franck: CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: Effective levels of firms' R&D are understood here to depend, at an international scale, on where they are located due to country-specific spillovers of fundamental R&D. A duopoly model is proposed in which each firm is initially located in a different country. Since knowledge is assumed to be complementary between the two countries, there is an incentive for each firm to set up R&D activities abroad, in order to capture additional R&D spillovers. A game-theoretic framework highlights outcomes, wherein both firms will localize R&D activities abroad, but it is collectively unprofitable for them to do so. It is shown that non-cooperative intervention by the two countries, in the form of lump-sum taxes on foreign entry, may eliminate such a Prisoners' Dilemma.

Keywords: absorption des connaissances; R&D des entreprises; localisation internationale (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Published in Revue Economique, 2005, 56 (6), pp.1207-1226

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00106849

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