Trade Unions v. statistical discrimination: theory and application to Post-Apartheid South Africa

Sandrine Rospabé and Jean-Paul Azam ()
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Sandrine Rospabé: CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: A simple model of statistical discrimination is analyzed, which captures some stylized facts of the South African labor market. It shows that this type of discrimination disappears when the wage rates are determined by efficient bargaining between a representative firm and a union, with endogenous membership. This may explain why the wage gap between Black and White workers in post-apartheid South Africa is smaller among unionized workers than among non-unionized ones.

Keywords: Labor; Discrimination; Trade unions; South Africa (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Published in Journal of Development Economics, 2007, 84 (1), pp.417-444. ⟨10.1016/j.jdeveco.2005.12.005⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Trade unions vs. statistical discrimination: Theory and application to post-apartheid South Africa (2007)
Working Paper: Trade Unions v. Statistical Discrimination: Theory and Application to Post-Apartheid South Africa (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00109384

DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2005.12.005

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