UNE GENERALISATION DU THEOREME DE REPONSE RAPIDE DE BASKAR AVEC UNE APPLICATION AU CHOIX DU NIVEAU DE CAPITALISATION DES FIRMES

Patrick Guy ()
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Patrick Guy: LAMETA - Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - UM1 - Université Montpellier 1 - UPVM - Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - Montpellier SupAgro - Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier

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Abstract: In this paper, we develop a duopoly model, which enlarges the frame used by Baskar in his 1989's paper. We highlight equilibrium, which is rational because the choice strategy is the best response according the set of believes consistent with the accessible information. The perfect Nash equilibrium is not compatible with the accessible set of information. The frame used, we give the possibility to extend the game for an initial period where the firms choice their capital level.

Keywords: Uncertainty; aversion with the risks; level of capitalization; imperfection of the markets; oligopoly; balance.; équilibre; Incertitude; aversion aux risques; niveau de capitalisation; imperfection des marchés; oligopole; équilibre. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
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Published in 1999

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00111641

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