A geometric study of shareholders' voting in incomplete markets: multivariate median and mean shareholder theorems

Abstract: A simple parametric general equilibrium model with S states of nature and K

Keywords: Shareholders' voting; super majority rules; general equilibrium with incomplete markets; median voter; mean voter (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-10
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Published in Social Choice and Welfare, 2006, 27 (2), pp.377-406

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Journal Article: A Geometric Study of Shareholders’ Voting in Incomplete Markets: Multivariate Median and Mean Shareholder Theorems (2006)
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