The folk theorem for games with private almost-perfect monitoring

Johannes Hörner and Wojciech Olszewski

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: We prove the folk theorem for discounted repeated games under private, almost-perfect monitoring. Our result covers all finite, n-player games that satisfy the usual full-dimensionality condition. Mixed strategies are allowed in determining the individually rational payoffs. We assume no cheap-talk communication between players and no public randomization device.

Keywords: Folk theorem; Private monitoring; Repeated games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-11
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (47)

Published in Econometrica, 2006, 74 (6), pp.1499-1544

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring (2006)
Working Paper: The Folk Theorem for Games with Private, Almost-Perfect Monitoring (2005)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00119553

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().