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Retaliatory Equilibria in a Japanese Ascending Auction for Multiple Objects

Stefano Lovo, Gian Luigi Albano and Fabrizio Germano ()

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Abstract: We construct a family of retaliatory equilibria for the Japanese ascending auction for multiple objects and show that, while it is immune to many of the tacitly collusive equilibria studied in the literature, it is not entirely immune when some bidders are commonly known to be interested in a specific object.

Keywords: Ascending auctions for multiple objects; Clock auctions; FCC auctions; Collusion; Retaliation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-04
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00119568
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Published in Review of Economic Design, Springer Verlag, 2006, 10 (1), pp.1-8

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