On the Feasibility of Power and Status Ranking in Traditional Setups
Petros Sekeris () and
Jean-Philippe Platteau ()
Post-Print from HAL
This paper aims at a better understanding of the conditions under which unequal rank or power positions may get permanently established through asymmetric gift exchange when a gift brings pride to the donor and shame to the recipient. Such a framework matches numerous observations reported in the sociological and anthropological literature dealing with patronage relations in traditional setups. A central result derived from our model is that an asymmetric gift exchange equilibrium can occur only if the importance attached to social shame by a recipient is smaller than that attached to social esteem by a donor. Moreover, if this (necessary) condition is fulfilled, an asymmetric gift exchange will take place only if the recipient's productivity is neither too high nor too low. Finally, the possibility of a parasitic response of the gift recipient is more likely to be observed when the donee's sensitivity to social shame is low, or when his productivity is high.
Keywords: Social esteem; status; power; patronage; gift exchange (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00122421
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8) Track citations by RSS feed
Published in Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, 2010, 38 (3), pp.267-282. <10.1016/j.jce.2010.07.006>
Downloads: (external link)
Journal Article: On the feasibility of power and status ranking in traditional setups (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00122421
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().