Do conflicts of interests affect analysts' forecasts ans recommendations ? A survey

Pascal Dumontier and Michel Dubois
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Pascal Dumontier: CERAG - Centre d'études et de recherches appliquées à la gestion - UPMF - Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble 2 - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Michel Dubois: CERAG - Centre d'études et de recherches appliquées à la gestion - UPMF - Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble 2 - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: This chapter reviews the literature devoted to conflicts of interest in the financial analysis industry. First, we identify the factors that may exacerbate and those that may mitigate analysts' conflicts of interest. Then, we investigate the empirical evidence relating to the economic consequences of these potential conflicts. Last, we analyse the effectiveness of the new regulations aimed at moderating analysts' conflicts of interests and we make some suggestions concerning future research.

Keywords: Conflicts of interest; regulation; analysts; forecasts; recommendations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Published in Conflicts of Interest - Corporate governance and financial markets, ISBN - 9041125787, Kluwer Law International - The Netherlands, 393 p., 2006

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00131386

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