Social interactions and secessions in medieval cities

M.C. Thaise-Challier
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M.C. Thaise-Challier: CERAG - Centre d'études et de recherches appliquées à la gestion - UPMF - Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble 2 - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: This paper interprets historical studies to analyze how social interactions acted upon institutions according to whether Medieval franchises (privileges) were granted or not in pre-existing or new towns. In the first case, lords and exclusive groups of inhabitants (elites: third party) negotiated a lump sum in return for franchises, which involved a ‘downstream secession'. Consequently, Medieval franchised pre-existing towns (FPTs) were both countervailing and secessionist institutions. In contrast, in Medieval franchised new towns (FNTs), through an ‘upstream secession' and self-enforcement mechanisms (without elites), lords regulated newcomers' activities, which eventually led to mutual gains; FNTs proved to be incentive institutions.

Keywords: elite; property-right institutions.; countervailing and incentive institutions; ‘upstream' and ‘downstream' secessions; social interactions; Medieval franchised towns; property-right institutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Published in 2006

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00134089

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