Exit from short-term contract. A french empirical analysis, 1990-2002
Mohamed Ben Halima ()
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Mohamed Ben Halima: GATE - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - ENS LSH - Ecole Normale Supérieure Lettres et Sciences Humaines - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
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Abstract:
This paper tests the determinants of the transition out of short-term contracts by means of competing risk form of the semi-parametric Cox proportional hazard model. We use three labour market states distinguishing between exit into long-term contract, another short-term contract, and unemployment. For each type of exit, we define a separate hazard function that we'll call a type-specific hazard. The estimates are carried out from a dataset recording individual labour market histories, the French Labour Force Survey (LFS) collected by the French National Statistical Institute (INSEE). The competing risk model is estimated for all the individual as well as separately for men and women. Our results show that, for men and women, the conditional probability of exiting STC into LTC decreases after 12th months. Moreover, staying in the same firm after a STC increases the chances of getting stable jobs in the future.
Keywords: Short-Term Contracts; Duration model; Competing risk hazard model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Published in The Eighth International Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare (SCW), 2006, Istambul, Turkey
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00140052
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