L'influence de la dépendance sur les stratégies de contrôle d'un équipementier automobile vis-à-vis de ses fournisseurs: une lecture militaire

Gwenaëlle Nogatchewsky ()
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Gwenaëlle Nogatchewsky: DRM - Dauphine Recherches en Management - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: The increasing externalisation of activities raises the problem of the management of buyer-supplier relationships and in particular of their control. This paper presents a military analysis of the control strategies of a car component maker over its suppliers. The analysis suggests that different strategies are developed according to the situations of buyer-supplier reciprocal dependence. Their implementation relies on four types of control devices: knowledge, incentive, protection and seduction devices.

Keywords: interfirm control; buyer-supplier relationship; dependence; military strategy; actors'game; contrôle interorganisationnel; relation client-fournisseur; dépendance; stratégie militaire; jeu d'acteurs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00143137v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Finance Contrôle Stratégie, 2006, 9 (2), pp.89-119

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