Tax shape and the electoram budget cycle: a model

Marie-Estelle Binet () and Jean-Sébastien Pentecôte ()

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Abstract: An original model is proposed to give new insights about the political budget cycle. Given income inequalities among citizens, we stress the role played by the shape of a property tax system (regressive or progressive) and by public debt on the incumbent's incentives to cut taxes and/or to raise public expenditures in order to be re-elected. Furthermore, we discuss ways of mitigating the political budget cycle.

Keywords: Political budget cycle; median voter; regressive versus progressive taxation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-03
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Published in First World Public Choice Meeting, Mar 2007, Amsterdam, France

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00145187

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