 Exigences actionnariales et réseaux d'administrateurs: à quoi répond la mise en place des comités d'audit en France ?Stéphanie Thiéry-Dubuisson ()
Post-Print from HAL Abstract: This study develops and tests empirically a model of the spread of audit committees. This model is based both on the factors from agency and signalling theories and on new ones, drawn from the embeddedness theory. Empirical tests of the spread of committees are performed using a Cox model over the 1995-1998 period. Results suggest that the main determinants of audit committees formation come, on one hand, from the influence of Anglo-saxon institutional investors and, on the other hand, from the core position of the firm in the Business environment. Therefore, intercorporate relations are found partly responsible for the adoption of a committee. Keywords: audit committee; corporate governance; asymmetrical information; intercorporate relations; anglo-saxon institutional investors.; comité d'audit; gouvernement des entreprises; asymétrie informationnelle; embeddedness; réseaux d'administrateurs; investisseurs institutionnels anglo-saxons.; investisseurs institutionnels anglo-saxons (search for similar items in EconPapers) Published in Comptabilité Contrôle Audit / Accounting Auditing Control, 2002, 1 (tome 8), pp.129-150 There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00150132 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Post-Print from HAL |
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