Détournements de main-d'œuvre et externalités de la formation dans un modèle de concurrence imparfaite

Alexandre Léné ()
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Alexandre Léné: CLERSÉ - Centre Lillois d’Études et de Recherches Sociologiques et Économiques - UMR 8019 - Université de Lille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: For companies providing work-linked training, poaching is not just a potential risk but a tangible reality. The aim of this article is to explain how firms can be led to invest in the training of young people whom they will not necessarily retain. We define two types of labour poaching. We show that it may be in the interests of some companies to provide training, even if they then lose some of their skilled workers. However, this situation is not socially optimal. This may be good reason for government intervention.

Keywords: formation; concurrence; détournement; main-d'oeuvre qualifiée; apprentissage (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00150687
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Published in Économie appliquée : archives de l'Institut de science économique appliquée, 2005, vol.58 (n°2, juin), p.45-70

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