qualité de publication financière et gouvernance: cas du SBF 120

Chiraz Ben Ali ()
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Chiraz Ben Ali: DRM - Dauphine Recherches en Management - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: This paper examines a combined set of corporate governance features that influence disclosure quality in acontext of ownership concentration. Agency theory presents a theoretical framework linking disclosure decisionto corporate governance mechanisms.The study results confirm that firms with good disclosure quality aren't family controlled firms, they are likely tohave well dispersed capital shares, no double vote shares, executive stock-options plans and many independentdirectors in the board. These findings shed the light on corporate governance features that enhance incentivesfor good disclosure under high ownership concentration.

Keywords: Financial disclosure; corporate governance; ownership structure; board structure; publication financière; gouvernement d'entreprise; structure de propriété -conseil d'administration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-05-24
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Published in 28ème congrès de l'AFC, May 2007, POITTIERS, France. pp.1-34

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00154958

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