Une critique opérationnelle du welfarisme dans la prise de décision publique

Antoinette Baujard

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Abstract: Public decision makers are seeking the highest social welfare possible, hence the satisfaction of individual preferences in the population. How does the operational framework of gathering information on agents preferences affect the quality and the interpretation of public decision?The paper displays a model of decision to allocate a subsidy for public or private transportation. Individual preferences are revealed, at the aggregate level, by individual behaviours in different choice contexts. Using techniques of probability calculus of voting paradoxes developed by Saari, the loss of information due to these particular conditions of data collection are assessed and carefully analysed. Three conclusions are then drawn up: about the reliability of information and the quality of decisions, about formulating models, and about implementing welfarism.

Keywords: Welfarism; information basis for public decision; revealed preference theory; Welfarisme; base d'information pour la décision publique; théorie des préférences révélées (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00155130v1
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Published in Economie et Prévision, 2006, 175-176 (4-5), pp.51-63

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00155130

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