Corporate governance and profit manipulation: a French field study
Caroline Lambert () and
Samuel Sponem ()
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Caroline Lambert: GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC - HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Samuel Sponem: DRM - Dauphine Recherches en Management - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
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Abstract:
Profit manipulation has been largely studied through Positive Accounting Theory (PAT). However, the weakness of the results obtained would suggest using different theoretical and methodological approaches to examine this subject. In France, management controllers play a central role in profit manipulation. This paper offers a comprehensive analysis of their profit manipulation practices. Using results from 32 interviews in 13 companies, we argue that the spread of Anglo-Saxon corporate governance model has fostered such behaviour. Far from the opportunism hypothesis supported by Positive Accounting Theory, profit manipulation is used as a tool by management controllers to gain broader legitimacy within organisations and/or to adopt what they claim to be ethical behaviour.
Keywords: profit manipulation; management controllers; corporate governance; field study (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00170340v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (24)
Published in Critical Perspectives On Accounting, 2005, 16 (6), pp.717-748. ⟨10.1016/j.cpa.2003.08.008⟩
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00170340
DOI: 10.1016/j.cpa.2003.08.008
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