The dynamics of wealth distribution with asymmetric incentives and endogenous matching

Alessandro Citanna ()
Additional contact information
Alessandro Citanna: GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC - HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: In a dynastic economy with warm-glow bequest individuals can form firms in a frictionless matching market. Contracts within firms are subject to moral hazard. Production tasks differ in incentive intensity and the matching market is open until production takes place. The credit market is perfect. In a principal–agent context, we examine the long-run effects on the wealth distribution, and show the presence of hysteresis and poverty traps

Keywords: BUSINESS; enterprises; *CONTRACTS; *ECONOMICS; *HYSTERESIS; (Economics); *RISK; management; *MORAL; hazard; *WEALTH; Economic; aspects; POVERTY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-11
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in Economic Theory, 2007, 33 (2), pp.243-261

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00170561

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().