De l'efficacité du co-commissariat aux comptes

Fatima Bennecib ()
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Fatima Bennecib: DRM - Dauphine Recherches en Management - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: The question of joint audit effectiveness was essential for two reasons. On the one hand, the collegial exercise of statutory audit is in the heart of a paradox. On a side, the normative framework presents it like a means of reinforcing the credibility of financial information. On another side, the regulation history reveals a will of some professional auditors to preserve mandates, at the side of large audit firms. On another hand, audit research was exclusively devoted to the single-auditor dominating model, in whom the independence of the controller with regard to the controlled, is regarded as the principal source of dysfunction. In this context, we establish that joint audit is effective if, towards the audited company, two auditors are more independent than a single one. Joint audit effectiveness is measured through the perception of financial statements users, sole beneficiary of statutory audit.

Keywords: Join audit; effectiveness; independence; financial statements users; co-commissariat aux comptes; efficacité; indépendance; perception; utilisateurs des états financier (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-06-29
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Published in 2004

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00170879

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