La coordination des acteurs lors d'une attaque spéculative: l'apport des jeux globaux

Camille Cornand

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Abstract: This article surveys the literature on the question of the coordination of actors during international currency and financial crises. Until recently, this question had not found any satisfying theoretical answer. We briefly present the global games' theory before presenting its applications to speculative attacks and its implications in terms of economic policy. We finally evoke the challenges this new literature has to face.

Keywords: global games; speculative attack; attaque spéculative; coordination; jeux globaux (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-12
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00178468v1
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Published in 2002

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Related works:
Working Paper: La coordination des acteurs lors d'une attaque spéculative: l'apport des jeux globaux (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00178468

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